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The fiscal rollover – how long can we postpone the return to
growth?
With each passing month, more questions are asked as to what the British economy will
look like post-recession. After yesterday’s Autumn Statement Andrew Sissons surveys the
present situation and asks what it means for the chancellor.  
Taken at f ace value, yesterday’s OBR f orecast wasn’t very interesting – and not just
because it contains 195 pages of  complex charts and terse prose. Essentially, af ter a
lost year of  growth in 2012, the OBR appears to have rolled everything back a year. The
recovery will take a year longer to emerge, and the chancellor ’s f iscal targets will take a
year or two longer to achieve. That will surprise no one, although it comes as something of  a relief  to
the chancellor, because it suggests that his f iscal plan will still work, just more slowly.
But behind these headline numbers, a debate is raging about what the f uture of  the UK economy looks
like. Is the economy really going to return to normal af ter a sluggish 2013? Is growth ever going to come
back at all? If  so, where will it  come f rom? It ’s unlikely to come f rom consumer or government spending,
but is there any reason to think Britain can turn around its disappointing investment and trade
perf ormance of  the last two years? And what if  the Eurozone crisis, overseas inf lation and other global
f actors f ail to ease up? Presumably then the chancellor ’s f iscal strategy would be doomed?
The OBR’s analysis of  these questions is f ascinating, even if  their overall answer – that growth will
eventually return to normal, only more slowly – ducks the issue slightly. The OBR thinks that most of  the
UK’s economic losses since 2008 are permanent, rather than temporary – or put another way, that the
UK’s productive potential has f allen since the crisis. The OBR does not think there is a single explanation
f or this drop, but that it is likely to be a combination of  lower investment, labour hoarding, lower research
and development spending and capital mismatches, among other things. This raises a signif icant
question: if  the UK’s economic potential has been held back by all of  these f actors over the last f ew
years, why would we expect it to grow over the next f ew years?
This is not a throwaway issue; it is crit ical to the chancellor ’s f iscal plans, and to the UK’s f uture. There
is now a serious debate about whether growth could be permanently lower f or western economies, one
into which many respected economists have waded. Even putting such sweeping pessimism aside, it is
hard to see which bit of  the heavily- indebted UK economy is going to drive a recovery.
Now, as I have written extensively in the past, I don’t accept the growth pessimists’ arguments. There are
plenty of  technological opportunit ies to re- launch economic growth, and I still believe that a recovery
based on investment and trade is entirely possible. It will only happen, though, if  the government has a
credible plan f or growth, and there was litt le such material in yesterday’s Autumn Statement.
In this vein, it is worth contrasting the OBR and the chancellor ’s views with Mervyn King’s comments in
his inf lation report last month. To paraphrase, King said that the f uture of  the UK economy is highly
unpredictable, vulnerable to global shocks, and that many of  the normal rules of  economics – such as
that inf lation f alls when growth is weak – aren’t working at the moment. Worse, King’s comments seemed
to imply that there isn’t much else the Bank of  England can do to support the economy.
That presents a huge challenge to the chancellor. His original plan to boost trade and investments –
labelled “monetary radicalism” by David Cameron – was supposed to be led by the Bank of  England,
through low interest rates, quantitative easing and the like. The Bank now seems to doubt its ability to
play that role, and yet the chancellor still does not have an alternative economic strategy. If  he cannot
come up with one – and he’ll now have to wait until March at the earliest – his promises on the def icit
stand litt le chance of  survival, and the pain inf licted on the UK economy could be immense.
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